Abstract. Symmetry reduction is a technique to alleviate state explosion in model checking by replacing a model of replicated processes with a bisimilar quotient model. The size of the quotient depends strongly on the set of applicable symmetries, which in many practical cases allows only polynomial reduction. We introduce architectural symmetry, a concept that exploits architectural system features to compensate for a lack of symmetry in the system model. We show that the standard symmetry quotient of an architecturally symmetric and well-architected model preserves arbitrary Boolean combinations and nestings of reachability properties. This quotient can be exponentially smaller than the model, even in cases where traditional symmetry reduction is nearly ineffective. Our technique thus extends the benefits of symmetry reduction to systems that are in fact not symmetric. Finally, we generalize our results to all architecturally symmetric models, including those that are not well-architected. We illustrate our method through examples and experimental data.
Introduction
Symmetry is a feature of many multi-process systems that can be exploited in order to alleviate state explosion in model checking. A symmetry is a permutation of process indices that leaves the system model invariant. The idea of symmetry reduction is to replace the model by a smaller and bisimilar quotient that contains only one of the many states from the original model that are identical up to permutations. When the set of symmetries is large, the quotient model can be significantly smaller than the model under verification. In particular, under full symmetry the system model is invariant under all permutations of the process indices. This scenario is attractive for symmetry reduction as it allows an exponential reduction in model size.
Unfortunately, a system model may not be fully symmetric even when the system consists of replicated processes that execute the same parametrized program. Consider, for instance, protocols that assume a ring-like communication structure, in the style of the Dining-Philosophers resource allocation scheme. The fact that a process may only communicate with its neighbor to the "right" breaks full symmetry, as neighborhood is not preserved by arbitrarily rearranging processes. Similarly, consider the cache coherence problem in a modern multicore hardware design. As the number of cores continues to grow, they will likely not be pairwise connected, but instead exhibit lean communication topologies, permitting only few process symmetries. As a result, symmetry reduction of a significant magnitude cannot be expected.
In this paper we address this lack of reduction by generalizing existing symmetry-based techniques for multi-process programs. More precisely, we show that full symmetry reduction is applicable to systems that are not fully symmetric, provided (i) the system model is architecturally symmetric, (ii) the system model is well-architected, and (iii) the property of interest is expressible in a rich subset of CTL called Safety CTL. Under these conditions, which we explain below, architectural symmetry reduction produces a quotient structure that is an exact abstraction and can be exponentially smaller than the traditional symmetry quotient.
Conditions (i) through (iii) form the core of our approach. An architectural symmetry of a structure M is a permutation of the process indices that leaves the positive transitive closure of M 's transition relation R invariant, i.e. M 's reachability relation R + . In contrast, traditional symmetry reduction requires more strictly that R itself be invariant under permutations. A system model is well-architected if it provides, at all reachable system states, the possibility of return to an initial state. This property is common in reactive protocols that continuously respond to user requests, and in many non-terminating systems as a means to counter the effects of resource leaks. Finally, Safety CTL consists of all formulas built out of Boolean connectives and CTL's EF operator, including arbitrary nestings. We show that the standard symmetry quotient of a well-architected and architecturally symmetric system preserves-in both directions-Safety CTL properties. We formalize this preservation property in the notion of safety bisimulation, a relationship between structures that allows transitions in one system to be simulated by finite-length paths in the other and is therefore weaker than traditional bisimulation.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is to extend a well-known and popular technique, symmetry reduction, to a class of systems that the technique was previously considered inapplicable to. Given conditions (i) through (iii), any existing symmetry reduction technique can be applied to the model-no new reduction algorithm is required. This makes our technique combine effortlessly with existing tools. We finally extend our results to programs that are not wellarchitected: we show that architectural symmetry alone is enough to give rise to an exponentially smaller quotient that preserves-again in both directionsreachability properties.
Background

Kripke Structures
We use the standard nomenclature. Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions. A Kripke structure is a tuple M = (S, R, L, I), where S is a finite set of states,
AP is a labeling function that assigns to each state a set of atomic propositions considered true in that state, and finally I ⊆ S is a set of designated initial states of M . A path in M from s to t is a sequence (
The length of a path is the number of transitions in it. For instance, path (p i ) k i=0 has length k. A state t is reachable in M if there is a path in M from some initial state to t. We write R + for the positive transitive closure of R, i.e. R + is the smallest set such that 1. R ⊆ R + , and 2. whenever (u, v) ∈ R + and (v, w) ∈ R + , then also (u, w) ∈ R + .
We have (s, t) ∈ R + exactly if there is a path in M from s to t of length at least 1.
2. for every t 1 ∈ S 1 such that (s 1 , t 1 ) ∈ R 1 , there exists t 2 ∈ S 2 such that t 1 ≈ t 2 and (s 2 , t 2 ) ∈ R 2 , and 3. for every t 2 ∈ S 2 such that (s 2 , t 2 ) ∈ R 2 , there exists t 1 ∈ S 1 such that t 1 ≈ t 2 and (s 1 , t 1 ) ∈ R 1 .
If ≈ is a bisimulation, and for each s 1 ∈ I 1 there exists s 2 ∈ I 2 such that s 1 ≈ s 2 , and for each s 2 ∈ I 2 there exists s 1 ∈ I 1 such that s 1 ≈ s 2 , then M 1 and M 2 are bisimilar. Bisimilarity implies that the structures satisfy the same properties of the temporal logic CTL. CTL is the smallest set of formulas that comprises false, true, the atomic propositions (AP ), and is closed under Boolean connectives and the temporal modalities EX, AX, EF, EG, EU, etc.
Canonical Quotients. Many existential abstractions are based on the formation of a canonical quotient of the given Kripke structure, as follows. Let M = (S, R, L, I) and ≡ be an equivalence relation on S such that s ≡ t implies L(s) = L(t), with equivalence classes written as [s] . The canonical quotient of M is given by the structure M = (S , R , L , I ) such that
As an example, let ≡ L be the labeling equivalence with respect to L, i.e. the relation on S defined by s ≡ L t iff L(s) = L(t). Relation ≡ L is the coarsest equivalence relation that allows L to be well-defined.
Symmetry in Multi-Process Systems
The term "process" is used in this paper generically for a component of a concurrent system. A state ( g, l 1 , . . . , l n ) in such a system consists of the values g of all global variables (not associated with any process) and the local state l i of each process i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (values of all local variables of process i).
Symmetries of a Kripke model M are defined with respect to permutations (bijections) π : S → S on the state space S; we describe such permutations in more detail in the next paragraph. We extend π to a mapping π : R → R on the transition level by defining π((s, t)) = (π(s), π(t)).
Definition 1 A permutation π on S is said to be a symmetry of Kripke structure M = (S, R, L, I) if 1. R is invariant under π: π(R) = R, and 2. L is invariant under π: L(s) = L(π(s)) for any s ∈ S, and 3. I is invariant under π: π(I) = I.
The symmetries of M form a group under function composition. Model M is said to be symmetric if its symmetry group G is non-trivial; we speak of symmetry with respect to G.
For an n-process system, a symmetry π is derived from a permutation on {1, . . . , n} and acts on a state s = ( g, l 1 , . . . , l n ) as π(s) = ( g π , l π(1) , . . . , l π(n) ). That is, the local states of the processes are permuted by permuting their positions in the state vector. Further, π acts on g by acting component-wise on each global variable g. The action of π on g depends on the nature of g; we refer the reader to [8] for details.
Exploiting symmetry. Given a group G of symmetries, the relation s ≡ o t iff ∃π ∈ G : π(s) = t defines an equivalence between states and is known as the orbit relation; the equivalence classes it entails are called orbits [4] 
. Let therefore M be the canonical quotient of M with respect to ≡ o . Quotient M turns out to be bisimilar to M [4] . As a result, for two states s ∈ S, s ∈ S with s ∈ s and any CTL formula f over AP whose atomic propositions are invariant under permutations in G,
Depending on the size of G, M can be up to exponentially smaller than M . For example, for full symmetry in n-process systems, all n! many permutations of a global state with pairwise distinct local states are orbit-equivalent and can be collapsed into a single abstract state.
Safety Bisimulation
The goal of this paper is to dramatically reduce the verification complexity for certain systems with only little symmetry. The quotients that we obtain can therefore not be expected to be bisimilar to the original system model. Instead, we will use the following weaker notion.
, and 3. for every t 2 ∈ S 2 such that (s 2 , t 2 ) ∈ R 2 , there exists t 1 ∈ S 1 such that
If ≈ r is a safety bisimulation, and for each s 1 ∈ I 1 there exists s 2 ∈ I 2 such that s 1 ≈ r s 2 , and for each s 2 ∈ I 2 there exists s 1 ∈ I 1 such that s 1 ≈ r s 2 , then M 1 and M 2 are safety-bisimilar.
Safety bisimilarity is identical to bisimilarity except for the occurrences of R As with bisimilarity and CTL, there is a temporal logic that cannot distinguish safety-bisimilar structures.
Definition 3 Safety CTL, denoted by EF-CTL, is the smallest set of formulas satisfying the following conditions:
base formulas: The Boolean constants false and true are EF-CTL formulas.
For P ∈ AP , P is an EF-CTL formula. closure under Boolean connectives: If f is an EF-CTL formula, so is ¬f .
If g and h are EF-CTL formulas, so are g ∧ h, g ∨ h, etc. closure under EF: If f is an EF-CTL formula, so is EF f .
By definition, EF-CTL is a strict subset of CTL: neither next-time nor until operators can be expressed in (or generally translated into) EF-CTL. On the other hand, as common in CTL we use AG f as an abbreviation for ¬ EF ¬f . Thus, a CTL formula belongs to EF-CTL if any modality occurring in it is EF or AG. For instance, consider a system with two processes i and j and the property that it always be possible to reach a state in which the processes are synchronized. This property, which is neither of the classical safety nor liveness type, is expressed in EF-CTL as AG EF synch(i, j).
Since EF-CTL is a sub-logic of CTL, we can define its semantics by resorting to CTL. We write M, s |= f to mean that the EF-CTL formula f evaluates to true over structure M and state s, which in turn is to mean that with CTL semantics, M, s |= f .
We now establish the relationship between safety bisimilarity and EF-CTL:
2 ) be Kripke structures over AP and ≈ r a safety bisimulation between them. Let further s 1 , s 2 be states with s 1 ≈ r s 2 and f be an EF-CTL formula. Then
Proof : We show the ⇒ direction; the inverse direction follows since the inverse relation ≈ −1 r ⊆ S 2 × S 1 is a safety bisimulation as well. The proof is by induction on the structure of f .
(base formulas)
The interpretations of false and true are independent of 
Since ≈ r is a safety bisimulation between M 1 and M 2 , there is a state q ∈ S 2 with (q , q) ∈ R + 2 and p k+1 ≈ r q. In particular, q is reachable from q and thus reachable from s 2 and satisfies all requirements of the claim. Figure 1 demonstrates that the addition of CTL's next-time (X) or until (U) operators is enough to distinguish safety-bisimilar structures. The CTL formula EX B is true of the first structure in (a), but not of the second. Likewise, the CTL formula E((EF C) U D) is true of the first structure in (b), but not of the second. In contrast, the two structures in (a) satisfy the same EF-CTL formulas, as do the two structures in (b).
Architectural Symmetry
We are now ready to define architectural symmetry and show that, under certain conditions, it permits a safety-bisimilar quotient. Looking back at Definition 1 (symmetry), the crucial property of a symmetric model is its invariance under permutations. Since safety bisimilarity is weaker than bisimilarity, we can afford a weaker invariance notion, thus capturing a larger class of systems.
Definition 5 A permutation π on S is said to be an architectural symmetry of the Kripke structure M = (S, R, L, I) if
The architectural symmetries of M form a group under function composition. Structure M is said to be architecturally symmetric if its architectural symmetry group G is non-trivial; we speak of architectural symmetry with respect to G.
Note the difference to Definition 1: in item 1, instead of requiring R to be permutation invariant, we require R + to be. Consider a finite path p between two states s and t. Under symmetry, the permuted sequence π(p) is a valid path as well, connecting π(s) and π(t). Under architectural symmetry, all we can say is that π(s) and π(t) are connected in M as well, since (π(s), π(t)) ∈ π(R + ) = R + . Comparing the two types of symmetry, we confirm that architectural symmetry is weaker than symmetry:
Lemma 6 If M is symmetric with respect to a group G, then M is architecturally symmetric with respect to G.
Proof : We have to show that each symmetry is an architectural symmetry. Let π ∈ G be a permutation on S. Requirements 2 and 3 are identical in definitions 1 and 5. Regarding requirement 1, suppose π(R) = R, we show π(R + ) ⊆ R + (the other inclusion follows with a symmetric argument; note that R + is a finite set). To this end, consider (s 1 , t 1 ) ∈ π(R + ), i.e. (s 1 , t 1 ) = π((s 2 , t 2 )) for some pair (s 2 , t 2 ) ∈ R + . Let p 2 be a path in M that connects s 2 to t 2 . Each transition of p 2 belongs to R. Therefore, each transition of p 1 := π(p 2 ) belongs to π(R) = R, so p 1 is a valid path. Since p 1 connects π(s 2 ) = s 1 to π(t 2 ) = t 1 , it follows that (s 1 , t 1 ) ∈ R + .
Example.
In the following we demonstrate that Lemma 6 can in general not be strengthened to an equivalence. Consider a token ring model where the shared token regulates access to some resource. Such rings occur in hardware models and in communication protocols. Figure 2 shows the local transition diagram of process i. The process may be in one of the local states N , N + , T , T + , C; there are no global variables. Intuitively, N , T and C indicate that the process is "not trying" to access the resource, "trying" to do so, or is "currently" accessing it. The superscript + indicates ownership of the token. The process can move freely between local states N and T , and also between N + and T + . To acquire the token, it must currently be possessed by the left neighbor, process i − 1 (i − 1 and i + 1 are defined cyclically within the index range {1, . . . , n}), and that neighbor must be willing to release the token. This is indicated by the simultaneous transition Figure 2 . Analogously, to release the token it must be received by process i + 1, which must be ready to do so (indicated by N i+1 or T i+1 ). Let finally
be the set of initial states: every process is non-trying, and any one of them owns the token.
Fig. 2. Token ring example for resource allocation lacking full symmetry
It is easy to prove that the Kripke structure M induced by the parallel composition of n processes running the program in Figure 2 enjoys rotational symmetry: permutations of the cycle form (1 2 . . . n) leave the structure invariant. M is not, however, fully symmetric: consider n = 3 and the transition . In fact, consider any permutation π such that π(i − 1) + 1 = π(i). Then π is not a symmetry of M , by the same argument. As a consequence, for a symmetry π the condition π(i − 1) + 1 = π(i) is necessary for all i, and it is also sufficient. Thus, the rotation group is the largest symmetry group of M , and one cannot expect more than linear savings due to standard symmetry reduction for this structure.
On the other hand, applying Definition 5, we see that M is fully architecturally symmetric. We first show that π(R) ⊆ R + . The only interesting cases are the transitions where process i acquires the token from its left neighbor i − 1. After permuting such a transition, the process π(i − 1) releasing the token is generally someone other than the left neighbor. The resulting invalid transition can be simulated by a path that passes the token from π(i − 1) successively to that process' right neighbors until it eventually reaches process π(i) (some temporary moves from T to N may be required to enable the passing of the token). To show that π(R + ) = R + , one applies this idea to each transition of a permuted path and connects the resulting paths to a (long) final path. Also, I is invariant under arbitrary permutations, and L can be defined to be so. In conclusion, M features an exponential-size architectural symmetry group, but only a small polynomial-size standard symmetry group.
(End of example.)
Before we demonstrate the benefits of reducing architecturally symmetric systems in the next section, we show the following property.
Lemma 7 Let M be architecturally symmetric with respect to G and Reached be the set of reachable states of M . Then, for all π ∈ G, π(Reached ) = Reached .
Proof : We show π(Reached ) ⊆ Reached (the other inclusion follows with a symmetric argument; note that Reached is a finite set). Assume π(R + ) = R + , and consider t ∈ π(Reached ), i.e. t = π(r) for some r ∈ Reached. Then there is some initial state s ∈ I such that (s, r) ∈ R + , i.e. π(s, r) = (π(s), π(r)) = (s , t) ∈ π(R + ) = R + , where s := π(s). Since, by Definition 5, I is invariant under π, it follows that s ∈ I. Thus, t is reachable in M (namely, from s ), i.e. t ∈ Reached .
Well-Architected Systems
Architectural symmetry alone is not yet enough to permit a safety-bisimilar quotient. We therefore now consider models satisfying the following condition:
Definition 8 A system model M = (S, R, L, I) is well-architected if 1. M 's initial states are all reachable from each other, and 2. for every reachable state s, there is an initial state that is reachable from s.
The possibility of returning to the initial state at any time is common in reactive systems to prevent resource leaks in long-running executions, for instance through micro-reboots [2] . Communication protocols in the IP and telephony communities regulate the coexistence of interacting features. Each feature is a finite-state terminating process; overall behavior is described by continuously selecting an appropriate feature based on current input, executing the feature to completion, issuing appropriate output and then returning to some (often the unique) initial state.
As a concrete example, the model of the resource allocation scheme shown in Figure 2 is well-architected: first, the initial states are reachable from each other, since the token can be passed around until it reaches which ever process requested to have it. Second, every initial state can be reached from any reachable state by letting each process individually return to its initial local state (N or N + ); the token may again have to be passed around to whoever held it initially.
From the definition of well-architectedness, we conclude: R, L, I ) be well-architected and u and v be reachable states. Then u and v are reachable from each other.
Proof : Since M is well-architected, there is a path from u to some s ∈ I. Since v is reachable, there is a path from some t ∈ I to v. Again since M is wellarchitected, s and t are mutually reachable. Putting it all together, there is a path from u to v. The reachability of u from v follows symmetrically.
Architectural Symmetry Quotients of Well-Architected Systems
We now present the main result of this paper: From a well-architected and architecturally symmetric model M , one can derive a safety-bisimilar quotient structure M . Quotient M is obtained as the canonical quotient (see Section 2.1) of M with respect to the orbit relation ≡ o on S. In other words, EF-CTL formulas can be verified reliably over the standard symmetry quotient, although the underlying model is not symmetric.
Theorem 10 Let M be well-architected and architecturally symmetric with respect to G. Let further ≡ o be the orbit relation on S, i.e. s ≡ o t iff ∃π ∈ G : π(s) = t. Let finally M be the canonical quotient of structure M with respect to ≡ o . Then M is safety-bisimilar to M .
Proof : We first remark that the labeling function of the quotient is well-defined: Let s ≡ o t. Then there exists π ∈ G such that π(s) = t. Since M is architecturally symmetric, L is invariant under π, which implies L(s) = L(t).
We now define a suitable relation ≡ r between S and S , namely:
In particular, s ≡ r [s] for any s ∈ S. We claim that ≡ r is a safety bisimulation. The theorem then follows, since the initial states of M and M are appropriately related: for any
To show the claim, let
We prove the three conditions of Definition 2. We restrict our attention to the reachable part of M , which is commonly achieved by exploring M and building the quotient on the fly. That is, s 1 is an actually reached and, therefore, reachable state of M .
By the remark above about
s 1 is also reachable in M , by Observation 9 there is a path from s 1 to t, which implies (s 1 , t) ∈ R + . We now choose t 1 := t to obtain t 1 = t ≡ r [t 2 ] and (s 1 , t 1 ) = (s 1 , t) ∈ R + .
Note that well-architectedness was used only in the form of Observation 9.
We summarize this section in the following statement:
Corollary 11 M and M as in Theorem 10 satisfy the same EF-CTL properties.
We emphasize again that, assuming G is the full symmetry group, M is exponentially smaller than M , although standard symmetry may allow only an insignificant reduction. Note, however, that in order to apply full architectural symmetry reduction, the EF-CTL properties of interest must have fully symmetric atomic propositions. Consider again the example in Figure 2 , which allows only polynomial symmetry reduction: Since it is both well-architected and architecturally symmetric with respect to the full symmetry group, we can apply full symmetry reduction to it when verifying EF-CTL formulas, giving rise to an exponentially smaller quotient. In Section 7 we underpin this result with quantitative data.
Generalization: Non-Well-Architected Systems
We briefly demonstrate that well-architectedness is not even required if one restricts the set of eligible formulas further, namely to reachability properties:
Theorem 12 Let M = (S, R, L, I) be architecturally symmetric with respect to group G, and let M be the canonical quotient of M with respect to the orbit relation. For any state s ∈ S and an atomic proposition q,
Analogously, the theorem can be stated as M, s |= AG q iff M , [s] |= AG q. In other words, for architecturally symmetric systems, safety properties such as the unreachability of an error state can be equivalently formulated over the quotient M . To prove the theorem, we first show a stronger path correspondence result. It addresses the "disconnect problem" of existential abstractions, namely that in general a path in the abstract system may not be liftable to one in the concrete system. It turns out that under architectural symmetry, it is.
Lemma 13 Let M and M be as above and (p i ) k i=0 be a path in M . Then, for any s ∈ p 0 , there is a path in M from s to some element t ∈ p k .
Proof : By induction on k. If k = 0, choose t := s to get a path in M of length 0. Now consider path (p i ) k+1 i=0 , and let s ∈ p 0 . By the induction hypothesis, there is a path p in M from s to some state t k ∈ p k . Further, (p k , p k+1 ) ∈ R implies that there is a transition (x, y) ∈ R such that x ∈ p k , y ∈ p k+1 . Then
Concatenating path p and the path from t k to π(y) results in a path in M from s to t k+1 := π(y) ∈ p k+1 .
Proof [Theorem 12]: "⇒": Any path in M from s to t satisfying q can be mapped to a path in
by requirement 2 of Definition 5, proving M, s |= EF q.
Experiments and Further Examples
In this section we present some quantitative data to support our proposed technique. We consider the token ring example from Section 4 and show the difference between model checking this system by exploiting standard symmetry, and by exploiting architectural symmetry. We have already established that the Kripke structure induced by the system is rotationally symmetric, and that it is also both well-architected and architecturally symmetric with respect to the full symmetry group.
We conducted experiments using the Sviss symbolic verifier [17] , an experimental platform for symmetric systems. Sviss is based on the Cudd BDD library [15] and supports various symmetry groups, in particular the rotational and the full group, which are relevant for our example. We ran the example on a 2GB main memory dual-core 2.2GHz system. The property we verified is mutually exclusive occupancy of the C local state. This property is satisfied on this system, so that Sviss generates the full reachable state space (up to symmetry reduction). The table shows, for a growing number of processes executing the protocol, the size of the BDD for the transition relation, the maximum number of live BDD nodes ("Numb. of BDD nodes") during the verification run, and the running time. This example, although small, does impart the difference an exponential reduction makes over a polynomial one, namely the potential to scale up to large examples, especially regarding memory, the classical bottleneck of BDDs.
Architectural symmetry and multi-core memory consistency. With the advent of multi-core hardware designs, pairwise connected communication topologies will be too costly to support. Instead, hardware and software communication topologies based on rings, tori, trees, hypercubes, and specially designed patterns will likely abound [1] . No matter what the exact topology, it will be necessary to ensure some form of data consistency among the various cores accessing a shared memory segment. That is, for a particular memory location accessed by several cores, and possibly several internal core-level caches, the values stored in those processor locations should be consistent.
Violation of multi-core memory consistency can be stated using a formula of the form EF(∃i, j : v(p i ) = v(p j )), expressing the reachability of a state where two processors p i , p j have different values for a single memory location v. This formula has fully symmetric atomic propositions, so that architectural symmetry reduction techniques can be applied in a straightforward manner. As a consequence, the property can be verified over architecturally symmetric systems (whether well-architected or not), enjoying the same reduction as fully symmetric ones, namely with an exponentially smaller quotient.
FlexRay, Time-triggered architectures. In the automotive electronics industry, the FlexRay consortium has been formed by major car manufacturers to design a communication protocol for the control logic in vehicles [9] . Bus and star networks are supported, as well as any hybrid topology resulting from a combination of bus and stars. Many dozens of nodes can be connected in a FlexRay network, making full interconnection too expensive. Similar structures with little conventional symmetry are supported by the time-triggered protocol, where the network is a broadcast bus, often equipped with dual channels for fault tolerance [10] .
Conclusion and Outlook
We have described a new notion of architectural symmetry, which extends attractive benefits of symmetry reduction to many systems with little symmetry. The result is a potential for an exponentially more effective reduction in model size. The price we pay is an architectural requirement of well-architectedness and a specification language with less expressive power than CTL, namely EF-CTL. We have given examples of multi-process systems that can be fully symmetryreduced, although the model under verification is only rotationally symmetric. We have finally shown that the requirement of well-architectedness can be traded in for a restriction to reachability properties.
Relation to previous work. Symmetry reduction for model checking was introduced in [4, 6] , and in [11] using scalarsets for fully symmetric systems. These works demonstrate the potential of symmetry for an exponential reduction in system size. This potential can in practice be thwarted if the symmetry is only "approximate": some permutations in the targeted symmetry group do not leave the model invariant. The work of [7, 5, 18] generalized symmetry reduction to systems where, despite the imprecision in the symmetry, a bisimilar quotient can be constructed. The results in [14, 16] allow in principle arbitrary deviations from symmetry, but the reduction of course dwindles with the divergence from perfect symmetry. Our work, in contrast, deals with a different reason for limited effect of symmetry reduction: an insignificant symmetry group. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to apply symmetry reduction based on a large (say, the full) group to a model featuring a small (say, the rotational) group.
Our notion of safety bisimulation bears some resemblance with that of weak bisimulation [12] . The latter relates systems that are bisimilar up to externally unobservable actions, often called τ -transitions. Our setting is in a sense lowerlevel, as we do not distinguish between visible and invisible system steps and thus do not have τ -transitions.
Unrelated to symmetry, [3] defines an implementation relation that compares sets of executions rather than computation trees. In addition, unlike our notions of safety simulation and bi simulation, that notion does not seem to generalize to equivalence of structures. In particular, it does not guarantee that if an abstract model fails to satisfy a property, then so does the concrete model.
Future work. We plan to investigate precisely how to detect well-architectedness and architectural symmetry. If a system model is well-architected, it is usually not so by coincidence, but by design. For such systems, suspected wellarchitectedness can perhaps be verified at a high-level abstraction layer, akin to symmetry being verified or enforced at the program text level. As a last resort, well-architectedness can also be verified at the structure level, using a reachability pass from I forward, resulting in a set Reached , and one from I backward, resulting in a set Reached −1 . The structure is well-architected exactly if Reached ⊆ Reached −1 . Contrast the cost of this check with verifying symmetry, which is graph-isomorphism complete.
Regarding architectural symmetry, our approach to detecting it is based on the observation sketched earlier that π(R + ) = R + iff π(R + ) ⊆ R + iff π(R) ⊆ R + . That is, a model is architecturally symmetric exactly if every permuted transition can be simulated by a finite-length path.
An open question is how symmetry reduction based on process counters [7, 13] can be applied to a system architecturally symmetric with respect to the full symmetry group. Since our approach does not require full symmetry, a translation of the program text as described in [8] is not quite applicable.
